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MEDEA 1079: [MY] THUMOS IS GREATER 
…καινὰ προσφέρων σοφὰ,  
δόξεις ἀχρεῖος κοὐ σοφὸς πεφυκέναι: 
τῶν δ᾽ αὖ δοκούντων εἰδέναι τι ποικίλον 
κρείσσων νομισθεὶς ἐν πόλει λυπρὸς φανῇ. 
 
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων (E. Med. 1079) 
 
Few problems have so long and vexed a history as the question of the meaning of Medea 1079.  
In his 2002 edition of the play, Mastronarde dedicates an appendix to the line summarizing the 
issues with the long prevailing Platonistic reading that pits passion, as thumos, against reason, in 
the form of Medea’s bouleumata.1  He points out the problem with taking bouleumata as 
“reason” or “better judgment” arguing that they must refer rather to, “specific plans or 
resolutions,”2 specifically, Medea’s plans to kill the children.  I would, moreover, simply ask 
whether it ever made sense to suppose that should Euripides have wanted to establish Medea’s 
passion as overwhelming her reason he would have had a self-possessed Medea state the notion 
in such a sober declaration.3  Would it not have made more sense to hand off such a task to the 
 
1 Mastronarde 2002.  In addition to Segal’s reference (1996, 24 n. 27) in which he summarizes the approaches of 
Reeve, Lloyd-Jones, Kovacs, Michelini, Foley, and Gilbert, the reader may also consult Diller’s comprehensive 
listing of the modern scholarship on the question (in Lesky 1983, 227).  For a useful overview of the Antique 
philosophical readings, see Dillon (in Clauss & Johnston, 1997) who presents an overview of the Platonistic and 
Stoic readings of the line, and Gill (1983).  I concur with Mastronarde’s criticisms of Dihle’s approach (1977), 
followed by Burnett (1998) and will not be considering it further. 
2 Mastronarde 2002, 393. 
3 We may consider in this regard that the Neophron fragment (Stobaeus, Anthology 3.20.33 [= TrGF 15 F 2] On 
Anger), has his Medea, in addressing her thumos moving toward the threshold of the infanticide, distraught as she 
struggles to fend off the force of thumos and the onset of madness, λύσσα. In relinquishing her agency and 
voluntarism in the deed, she is to be contrasted with Euripides’ more chillingly sober and self-possessed 
characterization.  Mastronarde’s comment on how not only Creon, and Jason, but also, “the chorus, too, finds it 
more comforting to fall back on conventional beliefs and ascribe Medea’s violence to divine possession and 
madness rather than contemplate too closely the intentionality of her acts” (2002, 18), gives us a sense of how 
Euripides’ handling of the threat of madness may be seen in contrast to, and as answering, Neophron’s.  I will return 
below to a more developed consideration of what we may glean from Neophron, particularly in light of Michelini’s 
argument 1989: 115-35 for the historical priority of his version. 
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chorus?  Mastronarde reviews the range of problems that led Diller4 to propose “my angry 
passion controls my (revenge-) plans,” taking κρείσσων “in the sense ‘master of’, ‘in control of’, 
(so that the gen. is virtually objective) rather than simply ‘stronger than’ with a more obvious use 
of the gen. of comparison.”  Although Diller’s hypothesis does make better sense of the 
bouleumata, it does so at the expense of what Mastronarde and others concede to be an arguably 
strained usage of kreissōn that is “hard to establish by parallels,” leading him to conclude that an 
extension of the meaning in “a new direction” by Euripides would have to be admitted to 
“encompass ruling and guiding without the connotation of suppression and coercion.”5  In light 
of this problem and the full array of approaches, it strikes me as plainly evident that a truly 
satisfactory solution is as yet wanting.  And 1079 is, of course, embedded in the minefield of 
other problematic issues peppered throughout Medea’s great speech.  
  While Diller’s reading is advantageous in allowing for a consistent handling of the 
bouleumata, and this problem with the antique readings is definitely begging a solution, and 
while it is helpful that he has helped to open up the terms of the debate, I would suggest that in 
addition to the demand for broader parallels for the proposed usage of kreissōn we should also 
scrutinize the fact that such usage would not rhyme with the other instances of the term within 
the play.  I would like to propose that a more systematic consideration of the use of not only 
kreissōn, but also the other elements in the line, thumos6 and bouleumata,7 one that reads 1079 in 
 
4 Diller (1966). 
5 Mastronarde 2002, 393.  
6 Bongie notes what she refers to as the “expanded significance” (1977, 28 n. 5) of the term that accrues through the 
course of the play, and discusses the heroic tenor of the term in specific instances in more detail at (33-34).  See also 
Foley’s thoroughgoing analysis (1989, 69-70) of Euripides’ use of the term elsewhere. 
7 I find Mossman’s discussion of the prior instances of bouleumata (2010, 329 lines 1078-80 #2) in support of 
deleting the lines not adequately developed, and rather concur with Mastronarde that they cannot refer to Medea’s 
plans to save the children.  As will be evident, I am, pace Mossman et al., entirely confident of the originality of the 
lines based on my decidedly literary critical methodology.  See Michelini (1989, 117-18) on textual vs. literary 
critical approaches to the problem.  I concur with her argument for the ineluctability of the “heroic mood and tone” 
(118) established early in the speech.  Dyson (1987, 32) provides a useful overview of various approaches attending 
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a more tightly conceived narrative structure in line with earlier instances associated with not only 
Medea’s, but also Creon’s and Jason’s, usages of these terms, can be adduced in support of an 
even more fundamentally novel reading that takes τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων as a subjective 
genitive modifying θυμὸς.8  The reading I propose diverges from the full range of extant 
hypotheses, and will no doubt be met, fittingly, with skepticism.  However, to appreciate the 
merits of this reading, the line must be read as aligned with the prior instances of the relevant 
terms, and we must look at this full complex with literary critical eyes unprejudiced by the 
established assumptions.9  What is more, I present my reading of 1079 as the culmination of an 
interpretation of the great speech that will ensue from one simple and equally novel contention: 
as of 1020 the children are not present on stage as Medea addresses instead her imaginary vision 
of them as if they were present.  To facilitate an unbiased assessment of both aspects of my 
argument, I present first my reading of 1079 and the speech followed by the supporting 
argumentation in a separate section.   
I. THE READING 
 
Allow me to propose that we put aside provisionally the presumption, inherited from the deeply 
sedimented tradition, that we must rely upon a simple, or singular, reading of the genitive of  
 
to the use of the term earlier in the play. As will be seen, however, I do not concur with his inclination to read the 
bouleumata here as plans to save the children.   
8 Foley flatly asserts that, “the grammar of these lines [i.e., 1079] is not in question” (1989: 67 n. 22).  While it is not 
clear to me whether she means by this that she is not questioning the grammar, or that it cannot be questioned, such 
is precisely what I propose to do here. 
9 Despite whatever particular virtues of Reeve’s influential survey (1972) of arguments for athetizations of various 
combinations of lines in the modern reception of the great speech, and if for nothing else than its utility in exhibiting 
the remarkable array of implications of the passages taken under consideration, I will join Michelini in arguing 
against his methodology of local line-by-line textual criticism: “It is easy enough to raise a number of more-or-less 
persuasive objections to a difficult passage; and any defense of the received text is clearly weakened, if opponents 
are barred from showing the interconnections that make ‘sense’ out of a passage” (1989, 118).  It is from just such 
interconnections with earlier instances of all the terms in play in 1079 that the sense I find arises. 
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bouleumatōn as governed by kreissōn, be it as the object of the comparative as in the antique 
reading: X (thumos) is greater than Y (bouleumatōn); or, as essentially an objective genitive, as 
in Diller’s modern reading: X is the master of Y.  What if the deeply stratified debate has arisen 
from a vain pursuit of an interpretation of X and Y incorrectly limited to one or the other of these 
readings of the genitive?  What if the inadequacy of this simple prejudice itself accounts for what 
are, in effect, ungrounded, chimerical attempts to determine the significations of thumos and 
bouleumata, and the force of kreissōn, and the resultant meaning of the line?  
I propose that we begin anew, provisionally taking τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων not simply as 
governed by the common comparative of X (thumos) is greater than Y (bouleumatōn), but rather 
as a subjective genitive modifying thumos in the sense of “the thumos of my bouleumatōn.”  The 
full line would then read: “the thumos of my bouleumatōn is kreissōn…”, “the heroic warrior 
spirit10 of my plans is stronger…”.  But stronger than what?  What would be the object of the 
comparative?  Stronger than what is left implied, namely the thumos of Jason’s bouleumatōn: the 
X of Y is stronger [than Z]; Medea is stronger than Jason.  (I say “provisionally” now, as below I 
will introduce a further wrinkle on this interpretation that actually bends back to a dual reading 
actually that reclaims as well the sense of the comparative genitive read on a higher level, but 
that must wait.  I ask as well my reader’s patience for my consideration of possible comparanda 
in support of this proposed grammar to be presented in the appendix at the end of the study.) 
 
10 I would point to the sort of stubborn and rancorous heroic thumos that Nestor attributes to Agamemnon at Il. 
9.109, μεγαλήτορι θυμῷ, as quite close to the inflection on thumos I am reading here.  I will return below to consider 
the heroic sense of thumos for which I am arguing.  Cf. Rickert on the “heroic principles of harming enemies, 
helping friends, not submitting to dishonor, injustice, insults, or the mockery of one’s enemies” (1987, 99).  I concur 
with her position that the reduction of thumos to passion, particularly as colored as “evil and in conflict with reason, 
which is good, is at the center of many unsatisfactory interpretations of this drama” (1987, 100).  Her discussion, 
moreover, of problematic applications of Plato’s conception of thumos is worth consulting, in particular her 
reference to Lloyd-Jones (1980, 54) on the question, “The address to one's θυμός is of course Homeric; but as often 
in tragedy the θυμός is not merely one of several more or less vague terms for the seat of the intelligence but 
connotes pride, spirit, anger, something like what Plato means by τὸ θυμοειδές” (1987, 100). 
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Medea’s thumos is stronger than Jason’s thumos; Medea’s bouleumata to murder Creon, 
Creusa, and, thereupon, the children, supplant Jason’s bouleumata for the new marriage and 
Creon’s to exile Medea.  That it is specifically the female warrior’s thumos that prevails over the 
males’ has not so long ago been shown in studies of Medea qua hero.11  To fully appreciate the 
ironic force of the thumos effected in Medea’s plans to kill the children we must appreciate how 
her plans arise in response to the prior context of the unfolding of not only Jason’s, but also 
Creon’s, plans for her and the children and how, thereby, 1079 is to be read as integrated into the 
overall unfolding complex of her agōn with them.  
 
The Nurse forebodes the threat of Medea’s scheming at the outset: 
For she abhors the children and takes no pleasure in looking at them. 
I fear that she may devise some new plan [τι βουλεύσῃ νέον]. (36-37) 
And notes her rising thumos, notes, that is, that her thumos, which had once been filled with 
passion for Jason, ἔρωτι θυμὸν (8), but has turned bitter, δυσθυμουμένῃ (91), is on an arc to 
becoming greater, μείζονι θυμῷ (108)―this θυμὸς, I contend, when greater, μείζων, will be 
stronger, κρείσσων―in immediate connection with her conjecture as to the risk to the children: 
τί ποτ᾽ ἐργάσεται, “what will she do?” (108). 
  Before turning in a moment to the substance of Medea’s “new” planning, I pause over 
this reference as foreshadowing what is generally taken, especially by T. V. Buttrey,12 to have 
been new in Euripides’ Medea, namely the infanticide; this Medea’s new scheming will prove at 
once to be the defining element on the metanarrational level of Euripides’ new dramatic plan.  I 
 
11 See Knox (1977) and Bongie (1977).  I am, however, more sympathetic to Foley’s recognition of how Medea’s 
gender reversal amounts to “an implicit attack on the typical Sophoclean hero” (1989, 82).  For discussion and 
bibliography on the question see also Boedekker (1991, 109 n. 56). 
12 Buttrey (1958). 
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pause here to note that while I am actually inclined to concur with Michelini’s renewed argument 
for the historical priority of Neophron’s Medea, and therefore the precedent of his Medea’s 
infanticide, and I will return to explain why I suspect this is correct below, I do nonetheless read 
Euripides’ treatment  of Medea’s progression beyond the plot against Jason, Creon, and Creusa, 
as representing a distinct, second-stage of the drama, very much in the spirit of what Buttrey 
finds, that the audience would, despite whatever knowledge they might have of Neophron’s 
precedent, not necessarily anticipate.  For despite the precedent of one infanticide Medea, this 
precedent would be vying with the full range of the other inflections of Medea’s tale in myth.  
Thus the audience would need not assume that even were Euripides’ hearkening in some 
measure to Neophron in these early hints of threats to the children he would necessarily follow 
through on what was presumably still sensed as an outlying version of her tale.  Therefore, I do 
still, along with Buttrey, read the play as essentially divided in two between Medea’s original 
plans to be supplemented by the extended plans to kill the children in a second stage.  It will be 
clear below why I put it this way.  Medea’s plan to kill the children is the new plan that will 
overpower Jason’s plans, but is also Euripides’ plan to take his infanticide Medea to the new 
level of tragedy beyond the Medea of Argonautic epic myth, to exalt a hero of tragedy, champion 
of a new ironic critique of the paradigmatic kleos of the hero of epic. 
So, in line with Buttrey’s interpretation of Medea as comprising “two plays”—the first 
operating within the framework of what the audience would have been expecting from the 
Argonautic tradition, the second pushing out into the new horror of the infanticide—Medea’s 
planning is formulated in two stages.  The first stage is marked by her open expression of her 
intention to kill Creon, Creusa, and Jason (364-409) to the chorus of Corinthian women after 
Creon’s exit.  This section opens with Creon noting the threat posed by Medea’s, as he puts it, 
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“raging against her husband,” πόσει θυμουμένην, in the first line of his entrance speech at 271.  
Medea is the subject of the verb derived from thumos; Jason is the object who runs the risk of 
being harmed by Medea’s raging thumos, emphasized as Creon’s first concern.  If the risk were 
to be realized it would take the form of Medea’s thumos, X, prevailing over Jason, Z, (along with 
the threat of collateral damage to Creon and his daughter) and would thus be consistent with my 
X of Y is greater (than Z) reading of 1079.  Moreover, it is precisely in anticipation of such a risk 
that Creon has come with an “announcement of [his] new (prophylactic) plans,” καινῶν ἄγγελον  
βουλευμάτων (270), plans for Medea’s exile as an addendum to the original inciting plans for 
Jason’s second marriage.  Creon’s new plans will, however, not succeed in forestalling Medea’s 
plans, or her μηχανή (260), to which Medea had just persuaded the chorus to assent. 
From 271-315 the two exchange extended speeches in which Creon sticks by his edict of 
exile for Medea who makes her case against Jason in response.  In the last of these speeches 
Creon is still resisting Medea for fear of what she might be planning: 
 The words you speak sound soft, but within your mind 
 I fear you are planning [βουλεύσῃς] some evil, 
 Indeed, I trust you less now than before  
 For a woman with a sharp thumos [ὀξύθυμος], or likewise a man, 
 Is easier to guard against than a clever one who is silent. (316-320) 
The evil plans that he fears at this point are such as the audience expects of their Medea of myth 
and which she openly announces in her speech following Creon’s partial acquiescence and exit, 
namely the ordeals of her “three enemies” (374), Creon, Creusa, and Jason―the boulemata (372) 
that Medea declares Creon could have forestalled had he not succumbed to her request to 
postpone her exile one day. 
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Creon’s words bring bouleumata and thumos together for the first time in the framework 
of Medea’s first-stage (or “old,” i.e., mythic) planning.  Creon fears a clever, feminine plan that 
will play out silently, that will not openly exhibit thumos, at least not the sort of sharp—let’s call 
it openly heroic—thumos we will see in action at 1079.  Moreover, while we will see this 
relationship modified with Medea’s new, second-stage plans, here bouleumata and thumos are 
out of alignment with the common readings of 1079 in that thumos is already being considered in 
terms of belonging to bouleumata, although here noted in its seeming absence.  We can see how 
Medea would take umbrage here in being characterized as but a guileful, secretive woman 
lacking thumos, as later she will exult, as I contend, in the greater thumos of her plans.  Here the 
first-stage (mythic) bouleumata lack thumos (or at least an openly heroic thumos)—there is no X 
in these Y; at 1079 the second-stage (tragic) bouleumata will have come to possess thumos, that 
is, a greater, heroic, thumos—the X of Y is greater.  The character of the first-stage planning is 
evident as Medea exhorts herself—or perhaps we could say, her person—not, as later, to open 
action, but rather to guileful technē: “Medea, as you plan [βουλεύουσα] and scheme 
[τεχνωμένη], go forward to the awesome deed” (402-03).  In the second-stage plans it will be 
thumos—I balk at saying “her” thumos for reasons that will be presented below—that Medea will 
resist as an other, as a force that would, that will, overcome her person: “But no, oh [my] thumos 
[θυμέ], do not do these things” (1057). 
 If first we see bouleumata and thumos lining up in Creon’s reference to Medea’s first- 
stage planning, four lines into Jason’s first speech we find bouleumata lined up with kreissōn, 
the other critical element of 1079, in what will amount to the incitement for Medea to recast her 
first-stage plans in their second-stage (tragi-) heroic form.  Jason goads her in suggesting that 
everything would have worked out fine if only “she had born lightly the bouleumata of her 
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betters,” κούφως φερούσῃ κρεισσόνων βουλεύματα (449).  And this line is no better aligned 
with the common reading of kreissōn as comparative at 1079 than was Creon’s juxtaposition of 
thumos and bouleumata.  Instead, we learn here precisely what it is that will make the thumos of 
Medea’s bouleumatōn kreissōn, namely that she will specifically overcome the βουλεύματα of 
those who only seem, for the moment, to be κρεισσόνων. 
 As Buttrey argues, the Aigeus episode marks the transition to the “second play.”  This is 
confirmed in what has changed for Medea.  For, having found a safe harbor for her premeditated 
plans, her bouleumata, τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων (769), she—and Euripides—is now prepared to 
divulge “all her bouleumata” (772-73), that is, report how she has recast her plans—and how 
Euripides has recast myth—anew to recall the overtones of the nurse’s early foreboding, 
μή τι βουλεύσῃ νέον13 (37), “lest she will cast some new plan.”  This transition from the first-
stage plan to the new, second-stage is also marked metatextually as Euripides announces that he 
too is done with the mythic account: ἐνταῦθα μέντοι τόνδ᾽ ἀπαλλάσσω λόγον (790), “and so I 
will leave behind this account for another,” as I would opt to paraphrase how he conveys the key 
point of transition in the modification of Medea’s tale in her concluding gesture to the “old” 
plan.  It will be the new plan that will ensure, as we learn in the closing words of this speech, that 
Medea will win the eternal kleos of the warrior, εὐκλεέστατος βίος (810) to be secured in her 
open display of a greater thumos.  The section closes, however, with the chorus wondering how 
Medea will ever find the courage, θράσος (856),14 how she will manage with a suffering thumos, 
τλάμονι θυμῷ (865). 
 
13 LSJ νέος III. anew, afresh. 
14 Here the chorus makes explicit the inflection of thumos as heroic courage, or “daring passion,” as Pucci (1980, 
224 n. 15) puts it.  Again, see Foley (1989, 69-70) for a discussion of the various possible inflections of thumos.  
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To supplant Jason’s planning—as he explicitly described it in their first exchange: “Have 
I really planned [βεβούλευμαι] so badly?” (567)—with her own, Medea must undertake a two-
step process.  First, feigning compliance,15 she stages a mock conversation with herself: “Oh 
wretched woman, why do I rage and bear such rancor for those who are planning [βουλεύουσιν] 
best” (873-74).  This mock address recalls her exhortation to rally herself to devise her first-stage 
plans.  But now, instead of rallying herself to devise secretive plans, she secretively pretends to 
be acquiescing to the plans of others, the plans of her “betters.”  Indeed, it is as if she must go 
back and erase, in a sense, her earlier plans—as Euripides goes back to efface prior myth—to 
accede to her second-stage plans.  She must clear the register of the earlier disposition of thumos: 
οὐκ ἀπαλλαχθήσομαι θυμοῦ (878-79), “why should I not transform that thumos?”  Indeed, 
allowing for a little license in translation, we might wonder whether Medea is not suggesting that 
it must be virtually as if there had been no earlier plan: ᾐσθόμην ἀβουλίαν πολλὴν ἔχουσα καὶ  
μάτην θυμουμένη (882-83), “I perceived the glaring ‘lack of a plan’ and the folly of that 
‘disposition of thumos’.”  So, in this juxtaposition we have an invented, vain θυμὸς of ἀβουλία.  
Renouncing this ἀβουλία, Medea purports to have concluded that she “should have participated 
in [Jason’s] bouleumata,” ᾗ χρῆν μετεῖναι τῶνδε τῶν βουλευμάτων (885)—those bouleumata of 
his, τῶνδε τῶν βουλευμάτων, that she will echo in line end collocation with her new bouleumata 
in the monologue, τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων (1079).  
Indeed, stepping back for a moment, we may now see how the three such line end 
instances of the term articulate the “second play” framework around the new plans:  
 
15 On Medea’s stratagem here see Barlow (1989, 163-64).  We may appreciate the irony Barlow identifies in 
Medea’s dissembling all the more when these lines are viewed, as I am arguing, as preparing and intimately 
connected with the reading I am proposing for 1079.  The perspective my reading adds to these passages serves to 
heighten all the more the pathos and irony of the reversal Barlow shows as pending in Medea’s great speech. 
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1. 769: τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, naming for the first time Medea’s new plans now made 
possible by virtue of Aegisthus’ offer of sanctuary. 
2. 886: μετεῖναι τῶνδε τῶν βουλευμάτων,  where the slight variance indicates that it is 
Jason’s plans that are being named as Medea puts her new plans to overturn his plans into 
play.  In implementing her new plans Medea will most precisely not be opting to join 
together—μετεῖναι, from μέτειμι—with Jason as she disingenuously purports to be doing.  
No, in this middle term of the three instances, she will not bring her plans into alignment 
with his; instead, their plans will be at odds as she will abandon—μετεῖναι, from 
μεθίημι—his plans. 
3. 1079: τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων Medea reasserts her plans as her own, definitively.16 
Returning now to Medea’s mock acquiescence, we see how, having cleared the register, 
so to speak, of her first-stage plans, and having feigned acquiescence to her “betters,” she is 
“now ready to plan [βεβούλευμαι] these things again, better [ἄμεινον]” (893).  The comparative 
ἄμεινον, albeit with adverbial force, here prefigures Medea’s reassertion of the thumos of her 
bouleumata as kreissōn at 1079.  What has been “now,” νῦν (893), newly refigured, both by 
Medea, and in Euripides’ dramatic revision, is precisely confirmed through the audience’s horror 
at that for which they had not been prepared by the Argonautic tradition: “Oh Children,” 
ὦ τέκνα τέκνα (894).17  Moreover, the cledonomantic irony of Jason’s acknowledgment of 
 
16 It is worth comparing in this connection Euripides’ use of line end references to bouleumata in Hecuba to frame 
speeches between Hecuba and Odysseus in which each accuses the other of evil bouleumata.  Hecuba opens her 
speech, where she pleads with Odysseus for her daughter’s, Polyxena’s life: οὔκουν κακύνῃ τοῖσδε τοῖς 
βουλεύμασιν (251) and Odysseus ends his speech stating that Troy got what it deserved: ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἔχηθ᾽ ὅμοια  
τοῖς βουλεύμασιν (331).  While framed negatively here as the rejection of the opponent’s bouleumata, the contest 
between them parallels the competition of bouleumata between Jason and Medea I read in 1079. 
17 A couple decades later in Electra Euripides would turn to another famous infanticide.  At 1011 Clytemnestra 
addresses Agamemnon’s bouleumata for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, and reinforces the term with the verbal form 
that follows: τοιαῦτα μέντοι σὸς πατὴρ βουλεύματα ἐς οὓς ἐχρῆν ἥκιστ᾽ ἐβούλευσεν φίλων.  Moreover, her revenge 
takes the shape of excessively vengeful counter bouleumata in a line end formulation identical to Medea 1079: 
οἴμοι τάλαινα τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων (1109-10).  That Clytemnestra goes on to suggest that perhaps her revenge 
was excessive, along with the fact that Euripides’ Clytemnestra indicates that it was less on account of the sacrifice 
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Medea’s acquiescence in his stating that she has now “found the boulê [βουλήν] that will in time 
be victorious [νικῶσαν]” (912-13), reminds us that we are dealing with a battle between the 
competing bouleumata of two warriors.18  The bouleumata of one will vanquish those of the 
other.  
 
 So on to the monologue: the opening refrain, ὦ τέκνα τέκνα (1021), as it echoes 894, 
confirms that we are coming to the new and improved, ἄμεινον (893), plan.  Certainly the speech 
transitions to Medea’s tortured consideration of her new plans to kill the children; however, 
actually, I will, in a moment, be arguing that we should reconsider our assumptions about the 
precise terms of the inception of the new plans.  Moreover, as I announced in the opening, I 
believe we can negotiate the tangle of apparent problems with the speech with one simple 
determination: the children are, in fact, dismissed along with the tutor at 1020 and in the 
following moments that have been universally read as Medea actually addressing the children 
present (or at least at differing stages accordingly with differing readings) with her on stage, 
instead she is picturing them in her imagination and addressing them in absentia.19  The obvious 
comparandum for this contention is Cassandra’s real-time manteia on the threshold of the palace 
of the horrific murder of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra, to whom, of course, Medea is often 
compared in broader terms (and as in the notes above here). 
 So, at 1020 the children are dismissed.  That the central concern for Medea regarding her 
new plans is the fate of her children is evident from the start in her idealized address to them, in  
 
than Agamemnon’s having taken a second woman, Cassandra, that she took her revenge upon him, suggests that 
Euripides is perhaps still thinking through the problems of Medea’s avenging bouleumata. 
18 Compare Fragment 200.3-4: σοφὸν γὰρ ἕν βούλευμα τὰς πολλάς χέρας νικᾷ, ‘one wise βούλευμα vanquishes many 
hands.’ 
19 See Reeve (1972, 54-55) on the problems associated with the assumption that the children are physically present. 
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absentia now, ὦ τέκνα τέκνα (1021).  Yet although the fate of the children is the thread that runs 
through and organizes the speech, we must forget what we know of what Medea’s decision will 
be and its outcome.  The audience in this moment, along with Medea, have not yet advanced to 
certain knowledge that she will follow through on the horrific deed.  This point is not merely 
critical for the drama of the speech, but also needs to be held in mind in order that we may 
correctly interpret Medea’s words through the monologue.  For it is first and foremost not the 
question of whether Medea will kill the children but rather whether she will follow through on 
the entirety of her plan, that is, first the plan to kill Creusa and Creon that is at issue.  In other 
words, although the speech will, on the other end, bring us out with Medea’s new plans 
formulated and the thumos it unleashes ascendant, going in here at the beginning of the speech 
Medea is not first weighing the question of killing the children but rather the first part of the 
plan, the part she has already launched, the core of her old plan, the part that entails killing 
Creusa and Creon.   
 As things stand now, as yet prior to the old-plan-element having been fully effected, the 
children “have a city and a home,” σφῷν μὲν ἔστι δὴ πόλις καὶ δῶμ᾽ (1021-22).  If Medea were 
to interrupt her murderous plan before it would be too late, the children would remain in Corinth 
and move to Jason’s new home with Creusa.  Such is how matters stand for them, μὲν ἔστι δὴ, in 
the present moment.  But it is not so simple, for while first I read this line as a statement of what 
is the case at the present moment, it must also be read as framing the two alternatives dependent 
upon whether or not Medea opts to allow her old plan to play out, for in the words that follow, 
“in which [i.e., in the house] leaving suffering me behind you will dwell forever bereft of your 
mother,” ἐν ᾧ λιπόντες ἀθλίαν ἐμὲ οἰκήσετ᾽ αἰεὶ μητρὸς ἐστερημένοι (1022-23), we must 
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grapple with the problem of the active voice of the participle λιπόντες.20  For it is Medea who is 
leaving to go into exile, and leaving the children behind.  While we could possibly overcome this 
apparent discrepancy in saying that it describes the children leaving the house Medea shared with 
Jason to go to Creusa’s, we should also hear the more sinister implication of the first reference to 
the new plan as we would imagine that the choice when parsed out across the prospect of Medea 
cancelling the old plan or letting it play out for the children is either for there to be a city, 
Corinth, for them or for them to go to another house altogether, the house of Hades.21  Going to 
dwell in the house of Hades, they will be bereft of their mother forever.  We will hear this first 
allusion to the house of Hades affirmed in the next below at 1053 where Medea commands the 
children to go “into the house.”  This is not a command, as has caused so much confusion and 
occasioned the various proposed athetization schemes,22 to the present children to go into the 
physical house in front of which Medea stands, but rather a command to the children in absentia, 
already in the physical house, to go off to the house of Hades, to go off to death.  I will address 
this below.  
 Medea will leave before she could attend to their weddings, “Oh how wretched am I for 
my willfulness,” (1024-28).  Woe for all that I have lost… for bereft of you, grievous my life 
(1029-37).  “No longer will you see your mother with your dear eyes, passing off to another state 
[σχῆμ᾽] of life” (1038-39).  The lines clearly indicate, as Mastronarde explains, their unhappy 
fate: “the surface meaning for the boys themselves is another form of life (that is, one with Jason 
 
20 On this issue Mastronarde says only, “λιπόντες... is not strictly appropriate to those who are staying while Medea 
departs” (2002, 334). 
21 Mossman notes that, “the ancient commentator is clear about these lines: ‘She secretly speaks of Hades’” (2011, 
319). My reading does resolve the issue she raises, “The house of Hades is a very common image; the idea of a city 
of Hades is hard to parallel” (319), as I argue that the city and the house (of Hades) are opposed as potential variant 
outcomes.  Later the chorus describe Creusa as having gone to the “house of Hades,” Ἅιδου δόμους, although the 
lines are suspected by many.  The notion of the house of Hades is clearly attested elsewhere, e.g., Alcestis 25, 73; 
Hippolytus 895; Ion 1274.  For a contrasting reading of the relationship of Corinth and death see Pucci (1980, 136). 
22 See Kovacs (1986, 344-45). 
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and a stepmother and without Medea), but the phrase is again easily understood as a euphemism 
for death,”23  hearkening back, as I argue, to the reference to the house of death at 1022.   
 The hypothetical reference to the children’s eyes triggers what has always been taken as a 
reference to the literal eyes of the children before Medea.  I contend, however, that as Medea 
moves toward her new plans, moves toward the threshold of contemplating the actual deed her 
new plans will require, she “sees” the eyes of the children in an ecstatic vision: φεῦ φεῦ:24 τί  
προσδέρκεσθέ μ᾽ ὄμμασιν, τέκνα, “Ai, Ai, why do you cast your gaze upon me with your eyes, 
children?” (1040). “Why do you smile that last smile, laughing…,” as she recalls in her mind’s 
eye their happiness…  Although we can only lament the limitations that working solely with the 
written text present in this most dramatic moment, I contend that we can nonetheless see really 
quite clearly from the next lines that the children are not physically present: 
Ai! What shall I do? My heart leaves me, 
Women, as I saw [ὡς εἶδον] the shining eyes of my children. 
I cannot do it.   (1042-44) 
Would it not be actually quite odd for Medea to say, “as I saw the eyes,”25 if she had just seen 
them standing right there in plain view of the chorus too?  No, they are not there.  Medea tells the 
chorus that she has just seen the eyes of the children because they are not there and she has seen 
the eyes only in her ecstatic vision and the chorus have not.  
 
 
23 Mastronarde 2002, 336. 
24 Compare Cassandra’s outcry at Aeschylus Agamemnon 1307: φεῦ φεῦ, as she experiences the house, δόμοι, 
reeking of blood (1309). 
25 It is interesting to note that Pucci opts to translate this in the present tense, “when I see [emphasis added] the 
bright eyes of my children” (1980, 137) presumably reading only for the simple aspect of the aorist.  Is this a more 
or less conscious reflection of the awkwardness of εἶδον with the children supposedly still present? Pucci asserts: 
“During most of this inner debate the children are absent from the stage.  Certainly they leave at 1053 and reenter at 
1069” (1980, 223 n. 11). 
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  And so she bids her bouleumata be gone, χαιρέτω βουλεύματα (1044).  But which plans? 
“Those from before,” τὰ πρόσθεν (1045), that is, the first-stage plans.  She contemplates 
cancelling the attack underway before it is too late, and leaving with her children, taking them 
with her into exile.  If she stops the attack before it’s too late, she imagines she could leave 
without any risk to the children.  No, why hurt Jason and hurt herself two times over.  She will 
dismiss the plans, χαιρέτω βουλεύματα (1048).   
  But next, as she turns back to the plan, Medea steels her resolve and faces the true brunt 
of the consequences of her first-stage plans in the requirement for her new, second-stage plans:  
But what am I doing? Do I wish [βούλομαι] to be a cause for laughter 
Allowing my enemies to go free? 
Must I not venture to do these things? Ah how base of me  
To even allow such soft words to enter my mind. 
Go [χωρεῖτε] children into the house…  (1049-1053) 
So whereas in her moment of weakness Medea contemplates dismissing her plans from before, 
her old plans, χαιρέτω βουλεύματα (1044; 1048), now she must reconsider what she wants, 
βούλομαι (1049), instead to opt to dismiss her children, χωρεῖτε (1053), from this world to enter 
the next, not the house before which she has been standing already bereft of the children, but 
rather the house of death as she now accedes to her new plans. 
  Medea balks momentarily attempting twice to dismiss the bouleumata (1044 & 1048) to 
kill Creusa and Creon, but then summons the necessary courage, “the audacity to do these 
things,” τολμητέον τάδ᾽ (1051).  However, she wavers again, as she addresses [her] thumos as an 
other, as mentioned above: “No, thumos [θυμέ], no, don’t you [σύ]26 do these things” (1056).  
 
26 While I appreciate Foley’s attention to the emphasis that γε lends to the phrasing, I am not sure I am reading it 
quite as it seems does she judging by her translation, “Do not… thume, do not you of all people [me su ge] do these 
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This further reversal has led to assumptions of interpolation, but in light of my reading we see a 
crucial shift at this juncture that triggers it.  Up until this point Medea has been pondering the 
consequences of either allowing her first-stage plans to play out or reversing them before it is too 
late.  This has involved her in considering the consequences of either course of action 
hypothetically.  If she intercedes, the children will have a city and home; if she allows the plans 
to play out, then the children’s home in Corinth will be supplanted by the house of death, (be it 
their death at the hands of the Corinthians or her own).  As she sees their eyes in her ecstatic 
vision, she weakens and contemplates interceding to dismiss, χαιρέτω, her first-stage plans.  But 
she cannot suffer the affront of her enemies and so she reverses her position and must rather 
usher, χωρεῖτε, the children into the house of death.  But it is this thought, or vision, now of the 
children crossing over the threshold of death, in contrast to the earlier vision of them outside the 
house with shining eyes as she had imagined them, that redoubles her horror, her ecstasy.  And it 
is now that she is exposed to what her second-stage plans, as the inevitable consequence of 
allowing her first-stage plans to play out, will unleash, exposed to what it will take to actually 
accomplish the deed: θυμέ (1056), “No thumos, do not you do these things.” 
 Here is the point to turn to Neophron, Stobaeus, Anthology 3.20.33 (= TrGF 15 f 2), 
picking up at this specific conjunction: τι δράσεις, θυμέ.  The simple fact that of the little that 
remains of the tragedy we have this key fragment is itself remarkable.  The conjunction is clear, 
but already there is a subtle difference between the two.  For in Neophron at this point thumos  
 
things” (1989: 70).  I see in the particle a special emphasis on the distinction between Medea’s self and the thumos 
she addresses, that otherness of what we cannot thus quite aptly or simply refer to as “her” thumos.  This otherness 
of thumos is what is reflected in my bracketing of [my] in my title and throughout.  Just the same Foley does 
certainly also read the play of this otherness: “A thumos that can impel Medea either to kill or to spare, and to hear 
the reasons on both sides for so doing, is apparently capable, like the Homeric thumos, of some sort of deliberate 
choice, even if, by 1079, the thumos is finally set (and was probably from the start irrevocably set) on doing things 
to Medea’s harm (kaka)” (70). I do concur with her characterization of thumos, “as a capacity located in Medea that 
directs her to act” (70), with some equivocation on the ‘location’ of this thumos. 
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has already gotten out beyond Medea’s control as she asks “what, thumos, will you do.”  Thumos 
is already conceived as a fully independent agent, whereas Euripides’ Medea still appears to 
exhibit some hope for control of thumos in imagining she may issue it a command.  The 
difference is subtle, perhaps at this juncture even negligible though given that Neophron’s 
Medea’s next words have her instructing thumos to “consider [βουλεῦσαι] it well before you 
make a mistake,” as Mastronarde translates.27 
  I point out here, incidentally, that this instance of thumos being taken as possessed of the 
capacity to formulate plans, βουλεῦσαι,28 would represent a critically important comparandum 
for my X of Y is greater reading of 1079 where we must imagine Medea’s bouleumata as 
charged with thumos, as here I suggest that we can move to seeing them as the product of the 
action of thumos.  Either Neophron’s attribution of the capacity of βουλεῦσαι to thumos may be 
presented as a potential comparandum ante quem of a Euripides reading Neophron, or post quem 
of a Neophron reading 1079 as do I.  I do not actually incline to the latter.  Whichever way the 
history dictates, however, this comparandum unequivocally connects thumos and βουλεῦσαι and 
is directly apposite to 1079 in a way that is not reflected in any of the other readings of the line.   
 My argument that the children are not on stage from 1020ff. may, moreover, inform the 
historical relationship between the two Medeas.  For in Neophron it is precisely at the point at  
which thumos has thoroughly taken hold of Medea and has been fully given over to madness, 
λύσσα, that the children are dismissed from Medea’s eyes, ἐκτὸς ὀμμάτων ἀπέλθετ’, which 
 
27 Mastronarde (2002, 59). 
28 I would thus pose this indication of thumos exhibiting the agency of formulating plans in response to Gill: “But it 
is uncommon, I think, to find the θυμός treated quite so much as an agent, that is, as one who performs, or refrains 
from, deliberate actions (μὴ… ἐργάσῃ… ἔασον… φεῖσαι)” (in Bramble, Whitby, Hardie, and Whitby 1987, 28).   
Gill reads Neophron as later, following Euripides.  Reeve 1972: 55 sees Medea’s earlier bouleumata―not those at 
1079―as produced by thumos: “Medea has mentioned βουλευμάτα before (769, 772, 1044, 1048): she had planned 
to kill her children. These βουλευμάτα are evidently the product of her θυμός which at one point she commands to 
spare her children (1056-7).” 
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Mastronarde translates, paraphrastically, as: “Children, go into the house.”29  Whatever is in play 
with the staging of the children, clearly the two versions are apposite in this regard as well.  I 
find it far more likely to imagine a Euripides starting from Neophron’s version with the children 
literally present and modifying it as I argue he has than the reverse scenario.  This relationship, I 
would contend, would also be all the more likely should Neophron’s Medea have antedated The 
Oresteia as the accounts, however sketchy, suggest.  The manteia, if I may somewhat loosely 
call it such, of Euripides’ Medea might be thought of thus as a ‘Cassandrized’ version of 
Neophron’s Medea at the physical threshold of the house and the definitive threshold that 
separates sanity from the outright loss of personal agency in madness. 
 In addition to the changed situation of the children, the key modification of Euripides’ 
Medea is the terms of her negotiation of her agency in the face of ascendant thumos.  Assuming 
Neophron’s play as prior, Euripides has complicated, or doubled, the situation of the children.  
Under the doubled figure of the house, as referring equivocally to the physical house and the 
house of Hades, the children are doubled in being physically within the physical house, on the 
one hand, and present to Medea in her ecstatic vision in which she mantically sees them crossing 
over as she foresees herself ushering them into the house of death.  Neophron’s presentation of 
Medea’s agency is, from what we can see, also simple; she approaches the threshold at which 
thumos, possessed by madness, takes over the planning.  In light of this contrast, it is worth 
focusing on the two poets’ use of the term τάλας.  Neophron uses the term simply to qualify 
thumos: ‘to what extreme have your rushed, wretched heart [τάλας].’  Euripides’ use strikes me 
as more complex, articulating, as I read it, Medea the person, the maternal figure, in contrast to 
thumos along the lines of the basic division of her character such as Foley asserts:  
 
 
29 Mastronarde (2002, 52). 
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No do not, thumos, do not you do these things, 
Leave them be, oh wretched one [τάλαν], spare the children 
 Living there with us they will give you cheer.  (1056-58) 
I am not entirely certain of how to read this,30 particularly as the first person plural ἡμῶν strikes 
me as, well, schizophrenic!  Speaking loosely.  Perhaps that’s exactly the point.  But I suspect 
that we should read a separation here between thumos31 and talas as a mark of Medea’s divided 
self, to hearken to Foley’s phrasing, by way of contrast to Neophron: “No [impersonal, abstract] 
thumos don’t you [σύ marking the divide of thumos as other, and other than talas] do this; oh 
wretched one, [maternal talas Medea herself, that is, in contrasted to impersonal thumos] let 
them be, living with us [‘schizophrenic’ Medea, maternal talas cum impersonal thumos?] there in 
Athens they will give you [talas Medea? σε, in something of a ring with σύ, marking the 
contrasting selves] cheer …”32   
  Again, it is important to recall what I introduced above regarding the opening of the 
speech.  Medea is not directly contemplating the murder of the children; rather, she is still 
considering the necessity to murder the children as the consequence of not stopping the first-
stage plan of killing Creusa and Creon.  So the alternative of taking the children with her to 
Athens, with no threat of Corinthian retribution, is still being considered by her as a possibility.  
However, I would also ask whether what would thus be Medea’s notion that she could bring the 
 
30 Nor, of course, am I alone. See Kovacs (1986, 343-52). 
31 While my reading for talas Medea and thumos as opposed adds another wrinkle to the equation here, I do 
appreciate Pucci’s characterization of thumos as Medea’s “imperious master” (1980, 139). 
32 I incline toward Erbse (1981), quoted in Kovacs, as regards the ultimate prospects for the children: “Erbse (pp. 
69-73) has argued that once Medea has sent the children with the poisoned robe and crown, it is no longer possible 
to conceive of a version of the revenge that does not involve their death.  The revenge-plan is an ‘unteilbare Einheit', 
and in order to kill her rival, ‘setzt Medea ihr Kinder aufs Spiel, und sie weiss genau, das diese nach Gelingen des 
Anschalges der Rache der Korinther nicht entgehen werder’” (1986, 344).  However, again I emphasize that I see 
Medea still considering at this juncture whether or not to allow the children to follow through with the plan; even 




children with her, either as innocents, or as complicit in the murders, was ever a true prospect.  It 
strikes me as no accident that Medea neither requested, nor did Aegeus grant, sanctuary to 
Jason’s children, and this leads me to ask as well whether this particular question may be useful 
in thinking further on Aegeus’ childlessness.  And would it not seem probable that even as 
Medea fantasizes of the possibility of bringing the children with her to Athens, living, she knows 
this cannot be, and knew not even to request sanctuary for them.33  Now bringing them there 
dead is another story, the one that does play out―hence the irony of ἐκεῖ μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ζῶντες. 
  Returning to the speech, the last whimper of talas Medea, however, shall not sway 
thumos, “by Hades’ avenging furies” (1059), “it shall never be thus that I―thumos talking 
now―shall abide my children subjected to the insolence of my hated foes” (1060-61).34  And 
now the die is cast, for Medea sees, again mantically, σάφ᾽ οἶδ᾽ ἐγώ, the death of her foes (1064-
66).   
 Now she, τάλας Medea, must go on the most miserable, τλημονεστάτην, road and send 
her children on that even more miserable road, to Hades of course.  Queuing up again for the last 
time the phonetic play between βούλομαι and bouleumata, she says: “I wish [βούλομαι] to speak 
to the children” (1069), again a phrase that really wouldn’t make much sense were they present 
there with her.  And I would argue that the dramatic impact of Medea’s request to her imaginary 
children in absentia for their most beloved hands, their most beloved lips, is just all that much 
more piqued than would be the case in the living presence of the children à la Neophron.  The 
two of them will be truly happy only there, ἐκεῖ, not, that is, as above at 1058 in exile in fantasy 
 
33 It strikes me that Medea’s precise plans regarding the children is directly apposed to her acceptance of her exile 
and left unclear in her pleas to Creon at 340-56. 
34 I see no problem concurring with the common consensus for athetization of 1062-63. 
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Athens, but there in real Hades.35  Oh sweet (imaginary image) of soft skin and sweet breath, 
χωρεῖτε χωρεῖτ᾽ (1076), go now, ushered off to the house of death.36  “For no longer can I look 
upon this image of them, vanquished [νικῶμαι] as I am by these evils, for I learn now what evils 
I must suffer/dare to undertake…” (1076-78).   
 
  And thus we arrive at that thumos, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων, that brings Medea beyond herself; 
in this thumos she experiences the heroic transcendence that will, ironically, win an eternal kleos, 
however infamous, this thumos, Euripides’, at the crux of the problem of 1079.  
 To read the line now I backtrack to pick up again two key moments that brought us to this 
point across the full scope of the play.  First, I recall those crucial opening lines in Jason’s first 
speech that would raise the agōn  (announced by Medea at 403 in the framework of her first-
stage planning) to the level at which Medea would be a contender for an immortal kleos, namely 
the agōn provoked by Jason’s statement that Medea should have “born lightly the plans of her 
betters,” κούφως φερούσῃ κρεισσόνων βουλεύματα (449).  I have yet to note that in Medea’s 
first-stage planning she already duped Creon into believing that she had done just this when at 
315 she states that she will “stay silent…”—while this is also to be read ironically as an 
indication that she is confining herself for the moment to the sort of silent guile that characterizes 
her first-stage tactics—“…having already been vanquished by my betters”: σιγησόμεσθα,  
κρεισσόνων νικώμενοι.  Medea is alright with stating, disingenuously that is, that she has, and  
even should have, succumbed to her betters, as part of her first-stage guile.  When Jason,  
 
35 Reeve (1972, 54-55) concurs with the consensus that the reference is to Hades and presents a detailed discussion 
of the problems that I argue are obviated by understanding Medea’s address to the children in absentia. 
36 That the reference to the house here is not the physical house before which Medea stands, but rather the house of 
Hades, is further reinforced in the sacrificial allusion that follows immediately: ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ θέμις παρεῖναι τοῖς  
ἐμοῖσι θύμασιν, αὐτῷ μελήσει (1053-55). On the sacrificial context see Pucci (1980, 131), citing Burkert (1966, 
118-19) who does not, however, note the reference to the house of Hades. 
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however, states that she should succumb to her betters Medea thinks “You want to see better?  
I’ll show you better!”  It’s time for a new plan, a better, ἄμεινον, plan that will raise the stakes.  
So whereas at 315 Medea disingenuously states that she has been vanquished, νικώμενοι, by her 
betters, Jason ironically indicates, despite himself, in their second exchange—and this is the 
second point—exactly how he will be vanquished by the plan, Medea’s, that will get the better of 
him, for she will have “found the plan [βουλήν] that will in time be victorious [νικῶσαν]” (912-
13), the plan that will prevail come line 1079: θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.   
  Thus it is the warrior thumos of Medea’s new plan, by which she will openly pick up the 
sword, that prevails, that is stronger…  But, stronger than what?  Stronger than Jason’s plan?  
Yes.  It is the newly found βουλὴ that will vanquish, νικῶσαν, yes, Jason, but… is this all of it?  
What if I were to admit that I am almost tempted now to turn back to the common reading?  
Why?  Because it is not Jason alone who is vanquished, but Medea too: 
But I am vanquished [νικῶμαι] by these evils. 
And I am learning the nature of these evils that I am about to commit 
But the thumos of my plans is stronger… 
That thumos that is the greatest tragic cause [αἴτιος]37 of evils for mankind. (1077-80) 
What if I were to admit that I have learned a new way to reread the common comparative 
construction just as Medea comes to learn of the nature of the evil she has been driven to, the evil 
to which [her] thumos has driven her? 
No, I am not yet quite back to the common comparative reading.  It is not best here to 
think that Medea’s thumos is greater than her plans.  Not yet.  For this thumos, which cannot 
really be said to be in Medea’s possession, was nonetheless born from her bouleumata, arises as  
 
37 See my hypothesis regarding a tragic inflection of Anaximander’s use of αἴτιος (2005), and Hesiod’s in my work-
in-progress book length study of Homer’s epic, Iliad ad Nihilum: Psyche, Conscience, Wonder, available online. 
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the open, masculine, second-stage, warrior thumos from the recasting of her mythical, first-stage 
bouleumata.  However, once this thumos has been unleashed it will not merely vanquish those 
who once dared to measure themselves as better, κρεισσόνων, than Medea—Creon, Jason—it 
will also overreach the one who, in her first-stage plans, resisted as a human, that is, mortal, 
talas, agent, but who then, in her new plans, overreached hubristically to transcend her mortal 
condition.  For as she is compelled to destroy her own person and became divine,38 to win an 
immortal, peculiarly tragic, kleos, she also serves Euripides in laying bare an unprecedented 
dimension of evil for mankind, the unprecedented dimension of tragedy.  It is Medea who has 
come to be possessed, and overwrought, by this thumos. 
In this light we may appreciate the irony of how, when she sought to lead Creon to 
believe that she can only be judged better by those who only seem canny, Medea is forecasting 
how she will have proved to be even too ποικίλος for her own good, and how she is herself not 
canny enough to escape outwitting herself, her own person: “for if you are judged better than 
those who seem to know something subtle you will appear wretched in the polis,” τῶν δ᾽ αὖ 
δοκούντων εἰδέναι τι ποικίλον κρείσσων νομισθεὶς ἐν πόλει λυπρὸς φανῇ (300-01).  The 
difference between her vanquished foes, Creon, Creusa, Jason, and Medea, and the difference 
between Euripides’ Medea and Neophron’s who merely goes over for lost in madness, is that 
Medea proceeds to her own destruction―destruction as human in her dæmonization―soberly, 
consciously, voluntaristically. 
 
38 See Knox for a thoroughgoing treatment of Medea’s divine status according to the paradigm of the deus ex 
machina: “Medea is presented to us not only as a hero, but also, at the end of the play, by her language, action and 
situation, as a theos or at least something more than human” (1977, 208), and, “her rage is fiercer than the rage of 
Achilles, even of Ajax: it has in the end made her something more, and less, than human, something inhuman, a 
theos” (224).  See also Barlow who argues that the climax of the play comes with the great speech and that her 
exultation at the ending is nothing more than “apparent triumph [that] only serves to highlight the loss of humanity 
that underlies it” (1989, 167-68). 
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For now, in the end, I am learning along with Medea how to contradict my own first-
stage thesis and affirm, according to the comparative grammar now raised to a second order, that, 
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, that is, that this thumos, the thumos that has now 
been unleashed, has finally proven to be greater than Medea’s plans in the measure to which it 
matters any longer that these plans were hers.  For this thumos ultimately effaces whatever we 
may still remember of her human agency―however petty, vindictive, proud; however 
hubristic―as the one who insisted on contriving plans of her own; this thumos has indeed 




Although I return in the final movements of the reading offered above to a rendering of kreissōn 
that conforms grammatically with the common comparative construction, the path that leads to 
this reading is not simple.  I present the novel reading above as expediently as possible so as not 
to impede the dynamic ascendancy of Medea’s mortal agency from first-stage feminine guile to 
second-stage warrior thumos through the willful assertion of her bouleumata.  Nonetheless, I 
hope that this presentation has clearly established that these specific narrative connections not 
only all build in a direct line to my new X of Y is greater (than Z) reading of 1079, but also that 
they shift beyond it to this new, complex reckoning of the comparative X is greater than Y 
construction as well.  The momentum of Medea’s ascendancy pushes her to the point at which 
her willful command of her own words—in which she touts the force, or thumos, of the 
bouleumata she herself masterfully contrived in proclaiming her supremacy, kreissōn, over those 
Jason had deemed her “betters,” κρεισσόνων—is pushed to the limit beyond which she is swept 
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away, with the shift in syntax, by the baleful hypostasis of a thumos that transcends the human 
agency of the bouleumatōn whence it arises. 
I contend that the prospect that Medea’s bouleumata, and the rhetoric she employs here 
to present them, outstrips her own human agency constitutes something akin to a κληδών, “a 
presage contained in a chance utterance,”39 that is, an instance in which secondary implications 
of words, or in this case rhetorical structures, uttered by a speaker work against, and usually to 
the detriment of, the speaker’s intention.40  And in this the cledonomantic force of her utterance 
raises what I argued in passing above to be the cledonomantic force of Jason’s statement that 
Medea had ‘found the boulē  that will in time be victorious’ (912-13) to a higher order.  Her 
boulē, once unleashed, will prove uncontrollable, will outstrip her own agency, ‘heroically’ 
conceived or otherwise.  Unlike instances of cledonomancy in which, however, the speaker is 
oblivious to the unintended implications until it is too late, I would contend that Medea is all-too-
aware, tragically, of precisely how she is being possessed by this thumos, ‘the tragic cause of the 
greatest evils for mankind’ (1080), which she has just directly addressed.  Thus we might call her 
utterance an act of conscious cledonomancy and her deed one of conscious self-sacrifice.41  How 
better may we account for the fact that the words of the chorus that follow Medea’s great speech 
 
39 LSJ. 
40 The role of cledonomancy was discussed by Peradotto with respect to Aeschylus, citing Halliday (1913):  
 
A κληδών in this sense is an apparently casual utterance heard by a man when he is deeply preoccupied 
with some plan, project, or hope, and understood by him as an omen of the outcome of his preoccupation. It 
was felt that such an utterance might have the power of bringing about an effect, “not indeed irrespective of 
its meaning, but other than the meaning or intention of the person who carelessly uttered it.” (1969, 2) 
 
Goldhill draws out these further implications: “Cledonomancy indicates the dangers of an inability to control 
language, which in eluding the speaker can lead him to an unwished end” (1986, 20). See also my discussion of 
what I refer to as ‘cledonographia’ in my treatment of Calchas’ manteia and Iphigeneia’s sacrifice in Aeschylus’ 
Agamemnon (2001) expanding the notion into the register of writing. 




are preoccupied with rhetorical subtlety and the ‘muse’ of women than in recognizing that the  
key to 1079 involves just such complexity, the play of just such finely wrought words:  
     Many times already [πολλάκις],  
Have I made my way through words more finely wrought [λεπτοτέρων], 
And come upon trials greater 
Than the race of women should be obliged to track out.  
But there is a muse for us women 
Who consorts with us for the sake of cleverness. 
It is not so with all of us, but just the same 
You would find some among the race of women 
Who do not lack the inspiration of the Muse.  (1081-89) 
That Medea is one such woman and that we must recognize that the finely wrought words in 
question are those she has just uttered is confirmed first in that Jason described her in his first 
speech as possessing a “subtle mind,” νοῦς λεπτός (529) and that the weapon that complements 
her devious logoi42 is the “finely wrought robe,” λεπτόν τε πέπλον (786, 949, 1188,43 & 1214).  
So then what other words in her speech could be seen to be ‘finely wrought’ if not those of 1079 
that have demanded so much attention and may be argued to constitute the rhetorical climax of 
the play?  But while the new X of Y is greater reading I propose is consistent with a Medea who 
has prevailed over her opponent through subtle words, once the construction shifts to the X is 
greater than Y construction, Medea has lost control of what her speech, as the means of 
executing her bouleumata, has unleashed.  Thus the question is whether the words of the chorus 
 
42 For a full treatment of the contest of logoi between Medea and Jason see Boedekker (1991). 
43 I leave aside the question of λεπτὴν σάρκα in the following line 1189, although if this was actually Euripides’ 
word choice here it would seem to further emphasize the term. 
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can be seen to cast Medea’s λεπτοτέρων μύθων as at once successful and ruinous.  In the reading 
above I began to explore how her speech to Creon at 292ff. prefigured how Medea’s bid for 
supremacy, her bid to be kreissōn, would reveal that she would prove too tricky, ποικίλος, for her 
own good. 
 It is not surprising to find that the robes are also described as ποικίλους (1159), 
“complex,” as this term is commonly used both of complexly embroidered patterns and subtly 
woven rhetoric and thus also parallels the way the leptos terms connect Medea’s rhetorical craft 
with the poisoned robes.  Let’s return for a second look at the one other use of the term in 
Medea’s reference to those who only seem ποικίλος: 
Not the first time, Creon, but on several occasions [πολλάκις],  
Has opinion harmed me and worked great evils. 
A man of sound mind should never  
Teach his children to be exceedingly clever. 
For apart from the idleness that comes from this  
They will incur the hostile envy of fellow citizens. 
For, on the one hand,  
in presenting fools with new tricks 
You will be judged useless and anything but clever. 
While, on the other hand,  
in the case of those who merely seem to know something subtle, 
Judged superior [κρείσσων], you will be judged wretched by the polis. 
And I share in just such a lot 
For being clever, I am envied by some, 
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[to some I am gentle, to others of the opposite disposition,] 
To those I am hostile. But I am not too clever.  (292-305) 
First, let me emphasize the point made in the first section, namely that this speech is key in 
setting up κρείσσων at 1079, first in Medea’s disingenuous indication that she has been wrongly 
judged as κρείσσων at 301, and then again in the last line of the speech where Medea 
disingenuously states that she “has been vanquished by those who are superior to her,” 
κρεισσόνων νικώμενοι (315).  To more fully appreciate the ποικίλος complexity of Medea’s 
ironic rhetoric, her words must be read on several levels, that is, reread several times.  It strikes 
me that this requirement is signaled in Euripides’ use of πολλάκις not just here at 292, but again 
in Jason’s opening words,  
Not the first time, but rather repeatedly [πολλάκις] have I looked upon 
How harsh anger leads to intractable evil. (446-47) 
which are clearly tied to Medea’s speech in his insistence that she should have born “lightly the 
bouleumata of those superior to her,” κούφως φερούσῃ κρεισσόνων βουλεύματα (449).  It might 
be admitted that even if Jason will be utterly vanquished in the end, he does—however 
unwittingly—have a point here.  For if my X is greater than Y reading holds, the next in Medea’s 
long πολλάκις line of harsh actions, in her bid to overcome those Jason dubs her superiors, will 
lead to not merely an “anger,” ὀργὴν, but rather a thumos that will prove indeed an evil 
“unmanageable,” ἀμήχανον (447), even for Medea.  
  And from this perspective I find my way back into the opening of the chorus’ words 
following 1079, “many times [πολλάκις] already, have I made my way through words more 
finely wrought [λεπτοτέρων]” (1081-82), for the chorus has “read” Medea’s (/Euripides’) 
wordplay, as now have we, on kreissōn and bouleumata a couple times over already.  What is 
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more, in a moment I will attempt to show how the momentum of these πολλάκις occurrences 
may serve to illuminate a problem as yet unspecified, namely, why do the chorus here refer to 
subtler words, λεπτοτέρων μύθων?  Why comparative?  What is subtler about these words?  
Subtler than, more threshed out than, what? 
 But back again to 292ff.  Again, I am working here on the complex of terms that play into 
1079, thumos, kreissōn, and bouleumata, all of which figure into this context.  At 270 the chorus 
indicates that Creon has arrived to announce ‘his new plans,’ καινῶν ἄγγελον βουλευμάτων, 
setting up his exchange with Medea.  Creon’s first words point to the disposition of Medea’s 
thumos against Jason, and thumos reappears in Medea’s speech at 310, while kreissōn appears 
first in Creon’s closing words before Medea’s speech, and then is reiterated twice in carefully 
structured terms in her speech, first at 301, κρείσσων νομισθεὶς, “judged superior,” and then as 
the concluding gesture at 315, κρεισσόνων νικώμενοι, “vanquished by my betters.”  
  I begin from two solid foundations: first, we must remember that Medea’s words 
constitute a disingenuous ploy throughout; second, I join in with those44 who see in Medea’s 
words ironic overtones of Euripides’ reflections on his own status as poet.  I turn first to the 
latter. 
At 302 Euripides’ voice comes into its closest alignment with Medea’s: “for I have 
shared [κοινωνῶ] in just such a fortune.”  For just as Medea shares the fate of the figure she has 
just been presenting in a hypothetical second person address, so are we led to identify Euripides 
as sharing with Medea in her fate.  For why else would Euripides have contrived to use 
κοινωνῶ?  Indeed, can we preclude the possibility of any among the audience hearing the 
consonance quite literally intoned as ἐγὼ δὲ καὐτ-ῃ τῆσδε κοινωνῶ τύχης, “And I (Euripides) 
 
44 See Reckford (1968, 349-50 and at 350 n. 40) for references to other scholars holding this view. 
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share with her this fate”?  And can we really imagine in this moment of pointed self-reflection 
that Euripides would not be “hearing” it thus too?  This conclusion leads me backward into the  
lines immediately preceding where the other scholars I refer to above have read self-referential 
allusions.  With the conjunction of Euripides and Medea more firmly in place, I note that 
Medea’s (/Euripides’) adoption of the second person hypothetical provides for the adoption of 
the masculine participles such that we can retroject Euripides himself metanarratively as 
masculine subject all the way back from ἐγὼ at 302 to the beginning of the μὲν\δὲ construction 
commencing at 298.  In other words, without the shift to the hypothetical constructions in the 
masculine, we would otherwise have to imagine feminine constructions in which these would 
have been directly and exclusively associated with Medea.  The shift to the hypothetical 
eliminates a construction that would have precluded assigning masculine gender to ἐγὼ at 302.  
But this then also leads me to conclude that Euripides has hereby contrived—and this all would 
amount to something of a ποικίλος trick indeed—a means whereby we can more positively apply 
the content of 298-301 to Euripides himself.  
 And so where do I find myself now?  In the uncomfortable position of suspecting that I, 
as perhaps one of those who δοκούντων εἰδέναι τι ποικίλον, “perhaps only seems to know,” have 
perhaps only imperfectly, at least for the moment, deciphered “the trick.”  What is more this trick 
would appear to devolve precisely upon the term that constitutes what I propose to be at the crux 
of the complexity I see at 1079: κρείσσων.  
I am again thrown right back upon the problem in interpreting lines 300-301 that I see on 
the most obvious level of the text, that is, when we simply seek to determine what Medea could 
actually be saying here apart from any metanarrational implications.  For what does it mean 
when she says that she is being judged to be kreissōn incorrectly—for her point to Creon is that 
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she is not a threat, not, that is, the threat that my X of Y is greater (than Z) reading realizes—by 
those to whom, however, she is superior?  If she is in a position to see that they are mistaken in 
judging her as superior, to see that they fail to see that she is actually not superior, “not so 
clever,” οὐκ ἄγαν σοφή (305), then is she not eo ipso superior, kreissōn, is she not actually 
“clever indeed,” σοφὴ γὰρ οὖσα (303)?  Has not Euripides contrived a Medea—a new superior 
Medea—who here contrives a means to demonstrate that she is kreissōn by proving her 
superiority over Creon in being able to persuade him that she is not kreissōn?  And isn’t it 
suggestive that this equivocation on whether or not Medea is kreissōn comes at this very moment 
of Euripides’ own deftly ποικίλος exposition of his own poesy in aligning himself with Medea’s 
purported lack of her own cleverness?  And finally, does not this ποικίλος tangle around kreissōn 
prove all the more deft in that it may be seen to prefigure the crux of the 1079 complex wherein 
the X of Y is greater reading is hinged with the X is greater than Y reading precisely on the 
question of whether Medea is kreissōn or not?  Whether the thumos of Medea’s ποικίλος agency 
is superior, or whether that thumos surpasses her own agency? 
So now to a more detailed analysis of the μὲν\δὲ  construction of 298-301: 
σκαιοῖσι μὲν γὰρ καινὰ προσφέρων σοφὰ 
δόξεις ἀχρεῖος κοὐ σοφὸς πεφυκέναι: 
τῶν δ᾽ αὖ δοκούντων εἰδέναι τι ποικίλον  300 
κρείσσων νομισθεὶς ἐν πόλει λυπρὸς φανῇ.  301 
The commonly accepted reading of the lines that takes κρείσσων as governing 300-301 in an X 
is greater than Y construction, where X is understood to be “you” and Y those “who seem to 
know something ποικίλος,” is certainly sound.  I suggest we should go further, however, in 
recognizing the sense of this reading as ironically prefiguring the sense of the X of Y is greater 
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reading of 1079.  For while Medea here is purporting that she is wrongly perceived as superior to 
those who set themselves up as opponents to her, in saying so disingenuously she is actually 
saying the opposite: while I will lead you, Creon, to believe that I merely seem erroneously to be 
superior, I am in fact superior. 
  But the lines can also be spun differently.  For it may be that Euripides has contrived a 
syntactical precursor here to the rhetorical shift between the two constructions I propose for 1079 
if κρείσσων at line 301 may be detached from the comparative construction by reading 300 as a 
genitive absolute.  Beginning from the commonly accepted reading of the line as an X is greater 
than Y construction, where X, “you”(/Medea), is, however, unstated, I note that something of the 
way in which κρείσσων νομισθεὶς reflects back upon the preceding line, τῶν δ᾽ αὖ δοκούντων 
εἰδέναι, could be applied to the relationship of line 299 to 298.  For δόξεις ἀχρεῖος can be seen as 
referring back to σκαιοῖσι.  So we can compare “to those who seem to know, judged superior” to 
“to fools, you will seem to be useless.”  I am not advocating this reading of 298-99 so much as 
trying to make a certain point.  There is a certain internal parallelism between these respective 
pairs of lines that I sense from reflecting upon an equivocation of the commonly accepted and, as 
with 1079, more obvious reading of lines 300-01.  For here we have X (“you”/Medea) being 
judged to be κρείσσων than Y (those who seem to know), but those who are thus being judged as 
those whom Medea is better than are at once those who are judging her thus.  Moreover, they are 
at once wrong in their judgment of Medea and themselves (or rather would be if Medea were not 
speaking disingenuously).  Similarly, in 298-99 the fools, σκαιοῖσι, who are presented with 
καινὰ σοφὰ—I will call them “new tricks” for expediency’s sake—are also those to whom the 
hypothetical “you” will seem useless, δόξεις ἀχρεῖος.  My point, however, is that we do not read 
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lines 298-99 this way.  Instead, we isolate 298 as a unit unto itself―an “absolute” in force―and 
then move on to 299 as a separate unit of sense. 
 I realize that the explanation of this argument is convoluted, and even that the logic of the 
argument, as I am about to present it, may seem a bit tortured.  But it may be worth noting that if 
we take the μὲν\δὲ construction as more tightly structuring the two pairs, that is, not just as 
structuring the sense as compared in the common reading, but more rigorously structuring the 
syntax, we could consider the possibility of 300 being detached from 301 similarly to how 298 is 
detached from 299, 298 μὲν / 299 vs. 300 δὲ / 301: 
σκαιοῖσι μὲν γὰρ καινὰ προσφέρων σοφὰ 
δόξεις ἀχρεῖος κοὐ σοφὸς πεφυκέναι: 
For proffering new tricks to fools, μὲν 
You will seem useless and in no way clever. 
vs. 
τῶν δ᾽ αὖ δοκούντων εἰδέναι τι ποικίλον 
κρείσσων νομισθεὶς ἐν πόλει λυπρὸς φανῇ. 
While in the case, δὲ, of those who only seem to know something ποικίλος, 
Judged κρείσσων, in the polis you will appear wretched. 
While I am not intent upon pushing this reading too hard, and I do not want to suggest that it is in 
any way indispensible to my X of Y is greater reading of 1079, there are a couple points to 
commend it.  First, there is a certain charge of enjambment on κρείσσων in the common X is 
greater than Y reading.  We may imagine that following the 298 μὲν / 299 sequence, an audience 
might first be inclined to construe 300 δὲ as a genitive absolute, only to feel a shift to the 
comparative charge on κρείσσων in the enjambed position.  Second, the similarity in sense of 
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νομισθεὶς and δόξεις, amplified by the phonetic echoing of the εις endings, may serve to 
reinforce the sequencing of detached pairs, 298 μὲν / 299; 300 δὲ / 301, made possible by 300 δὲ 
as genitive absolute, in the face of the charge that an enjambed κρείσσων effects in the shift to 
the common comparative reading.  I will leave off with this analysis here in saying only that 
were this along the lines of what Euripides is actually doing it would all indeed be something 
ποικίλος: τι ποικίλον.  Or, let me rephrase this as a question: Is Euripides being this clever?  
Would such an analysis of Medea’s, of Euripides’ words be too clever, ἄγαν σοφή? 
 Yet I’m afraid that this is not all.  For in addition to what I see as Euripides’ 
metanarrational presence in the speech, and the question of whether Euripides is previewing the 
syntactical shift of 1079, I also cannot help but note what seems to be another pattern in the 
broader movements.  Medea opens her speech by declaring, in the first person, how she has been 
harmed by false opinions, δόξα 293; next, she shifts to a hypothetical someone, a man, ἀνὴρ 
(294); from this Medea shifts to a hypothetical second person in the masculine (298-301), and we 
have just seen how this shift facilitated reading Euripides more deeply into the speech 
metanarrationally; next, Medea indicates that she shares the fate of this hypothetical second 
person; following this, we have the symmetrically framed complex of lines that hinge around 
Medea either being clever, σοφὴ γὰρ οὖσα (303), or not so clever, οὐκ ἄγαν σοφή (305); and 
then to a direct, emphasized, second person address to her actual interlocutor: σὺ δ᾽ αὖ φοβῇ με 
(306); and finally, jumping to the end of the speech, a shift from Medea pleading in first person 
singular to be allowed to continue “to live in the land,” τήνδε δὲ χθόνα ἐᾶτέ μ᾽οἰκεῖν (313-14), to 
her concluding statement in the first person plural that plays directly against line 1079, καὶ γὰρ 
ἠδικημένοι σιγησόμεσθα, κρεισσόνων νικώμενοι (314-15), “for although wronged we will keep 
silent, having been defeated by our betters.”   
36 
 
 I am struck by the subtlety with which Medea shifts from speaking of herself, through a 
putatively hypothetical second person (whose fate she shares), to an actual second person address 
to Creon, to conclude with first person plural.  What if the putatively hypothetical second person 
is not hypothetical?  What if Medea is already addressing Creon, albeit in a fashioned disguised 
through her distinctly ποικίλος rhetoric?  What if the juncture where her concealed 
“hypothetical” attack—and here we should recall that Euripides has Creon openly state that his 
“words (to Medea) need not be cloaked,” οὐδὲν δεῖ παραμπίσχειν λόγους (282)—shifts into the 
open, direct second person address, an address that moreover pointedly, programmatically, 
opposes the two pronouns, σὺ ↔ με (306), is mediated by her statement that she shares the fate 
of this other second person, namely the fate she will visit upon Creon?  And what if they both, in 
the plural, will be wronged, silenced, and vanquished by those who prove κρεισσόνων?  
 However challenging this ποικίλος rhetoric may prove to be, there are certain prospects 
worth considering.  First, we may hear an echo of the chorus’ reference to Creon’s “new plans,” 
καινῶν βουλευμάτων (270), in the “new tricks,” as I am branding them for this purpose, at 298, 
καινὰ σοφὰ.  In response to Creon’s bouleumata I would also point to the references to 
bouleumata that come toward the close of the full section (defined as running from 269-409 and 
following into the first paired odes of the first stasimon 410-430), first as Medea exhorts herself 
in her first-stage feminine scheming, Μήδεια, βουλεύουσα καὶ τεχνωμένη (402), and then, in a 
passage to which I will return below, in the chorus’ characterization of the “deceitful plans of 
men” (Jason and Creon in league) at 412: ἀνδράσι μὲν δόλιαι βουλαί.  Just as the confrontation 
between Medea and Creon opens with a reference to bouleumata, so does it close. 
Second, while Medea’s ploy in her phrasing of κρείσσων νομισθεὶς at 301 serves to allay 
Creon’s anxieties by suggesting that is she is not kreissōn, it is actually Creon who will in 
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retrospect be judged as having merely seemed superior at this juncture, that is, later when the 
wretched outcome for the polis in the death of Creon has been revealed, λυπρὸς φανῇ (301).  
And whose status is of greater significance for the polis than the King’s?  Yet while here the 
ironic implication is that Creon will prove to have been wrongly judged kreissōn in a fashion that 
aligns with my X of Y is greater reading of 1079, by the close of the speech, after Medea reveals 
that she realizes she too will share in this fate, we find that both Medea and Creon may be seen 
to have been reciprocally vanquished by one another—however, at once the one by one who 
truly will be kreissōn to the other, i.e., (a masculinized) Medea vis-à-vis Creon, and the other by 
one who will have merely seemed to have been kreissōn to the other in retrospect, Creon vis-à-
vis Medea: κρεισσόνων νικώμενοι (315).   
Looking even more closely we can see how Medea/(Euripides) balances the grammatical 
genders in the lines that apply reciprocally to both; at 299, where the shift to the second person is 
immediately followed by the first adjective, ἀχρεῖος, that can be read as feminine, as it would 
pertain to Medea’s case, only then with the next adjective, σοφὸς, to be decided as masculine, 
whether as Medea being conceived here as if masculine in being referred to as a merely 
hypothetical case, or as both now decidedly masculine adjectives are applied directly to the 
actual case of Creon.  And again, the undecidability of the gender of κρείσσων at 301 reflects not 
only the undecidability of the referent, be it feminine Medea or/and masculine Creon, but also 
accurately provides for the shift from feminine talas Medea to masculine ascendant Medea qua 
Thumos precisely in that it is Thumos that will prove kreissōn. 
 While below I will want to look at how at 1079 we come to a point wherein Medea will 
have openly “sung” this ascendancy, at this juncture we find Euripides having contrived for her a 
means of presaging how she will at once vanquish and be vanquished, all the while for himself 
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contriving a call for us to redouble our attention to his own ποικίλος poesy.  At this first-stage 
juncture in which Medea, as yet lacking the refuge Aegeus will later supply, must resort to 
feminine technê—and Euripides takes his reference to these guiles as his opportunity to remind 
us of her eponymous mythical reputation as “planning and scheming Medea,” 
Μήδεια, βουλεύουσα καὶ τεχνωμένη (402)—we must conclude that she foresees herself 
vanquished qua Medea by her foes, even if nonetheless victorious over them, and that thus 
Euripides is as yet only prefiguring the reversal of X of Y is greater to X is greater than Y.  This 
shift from first-stage to second-stage plans, from talas human agent to dæmon thumos, from 
feminine to masculine is, moreover, prefigured in the curious way that whereas Medea’s 
suggestions of common parental sympathies is marked by the shift from the progression of first 
person singular to first person feminine plural, οὐχ ὧδ᾽ ἔχει μοι, μὴ τρέσῃς ἡμᾶς (307), ‘there is 
no cause from me, you needn’t dread us,’ to the concluding movement that serves to prefigure 
the shift of 1079 in the progression from first person (feminine), ἐᾶτέ μ᾽οἰκεῖν (314), “Oh let me 
stay,” to first person plural masculine: καὶ γὰρ ἠδικημένοι σιγησόμεσθα, κρεισσόνων  
νικώμενοι (314-15), “for although wronged we will keep silent, having been defeated by our 
betters.”  They will both be victims, both vying equally as male or masculine at least, νικώμενοι, 
of the bouleumata of “the husband she hates”: ἀλλ᾽ ἐμὸν πόσιν μισῶ (310-11).  Moreover, that 
this shift points forward to the shift at 1079 away from the sway of humanly contrived 
bouleumata to the baleful hypostasis of thumos, by which the human agency of those plans is 
overwrought, is hinted at in the way that Medea’s indication that Creon is merely ‘following 
where [his] thumos led him,’ ὅτῳ σε θυμὸς ἦγεν (310), that is, following his thumos to his own 
ruin, evokes the question: where will [Medea’s] thumos lead her? 45 
 
45 The notion that Medea’s reference to Creon’s thumos prefigures the role of her thumos at 1079 occurred to me 
from reading Cowherd (1983, 132 n. 11).  I cannot, however, as is clear from my argument, concur with her 
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 In concluding my argument, I will now turn to the two choral odes that cap respectively 
Medea’s first- and then second-stage exhortations to herself: first, as exhortation to Μήδεια, qua 
person, agent of feminine scheming action, βουλεύουσα (402); second, as failed exhortation  
to bar the dread action, “do not do these things,” μὴ σύ γ᾽ ἐργάσῃ τάδε, to which Thumos, 
capitalized here to indicate the hypostatization, is leading her, “no Thumos,” μὴ δῆτα,  
Θυμέ (1056).46  
That Medea’s second-stage thumos and bouleumata are as yet only forecast in her speech 
to Creon is plainly evident as she indicates, in her speech following Creon’s exit, that he could 
have foiled her first-stage bouleumata (372) and prevented the anticipated outcome: three 
corpses (374).  The choral ode that follows describes the reversal of the stereotypical gender 
roles―as should come now as no surprise given what was shown above regarding the fine-
grained handling of gender attributions―and an overturning of tradition.  Rivers flow back to 
their sources and men behave as deceitfully as women, spinning their own “guileful plans,” 
δόλιαι βουλαί (412).  The result is an abrogation of the misogyny of traditional epic as the 
“legends of the life of women are now turned to a good kleos,” τὰν δ᾽ ἐμὰν εὔκλειαν ἔχειν  
βιοτὰν στρέψουσι φᾶμαι (418) and “no longer will malicious legends hold sway over women,” 
οὐκέτι δυσκέλαδος φάμα γυναῖκας ἕξει (419-20).  The traditional Muses of the singers of old 
will desist (421)—and let’s be listening carefully now for Euripides’ critical, arguably sophistic, 
response to epic mythos, that is, for his “new tricks,” καινὰ σοφὰ—from “singing the distrust of 
women,” τὰν ἐμὰν ὑμνεῦσαι ἀπιστοσύναν (422).  
 
conclusion that τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων at 1079 have become “plans to spare the children and carry them away with 
her.”  She does, however, rightly note the ‘excessive’ nature of Medea’s thumos and that “θυμὸς κρείσσων applies 
well to Medea” (132).  
46 I refer the reader here to my novel argument that it is θυμὸς, and not ψυχὴ, that is the aspect of the hero that is 
immortalized along with the conferral of κλέος in Iliad ad Nihilum: Psyche, Conscience, Wonder. 
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 This first-stage juncture is marked so far only by the abrogation of the epic authority, the 
thespis, of the traditional Muse by the forfeiture of the scheming men.  There is as yet no Muse 
of women: 
Phoibos, leader of songs, 
did not grant to our disposition  
The sanctioned inspiration [θέσπιν ἀοιδὰν] of the lyre, 
Or I would have opposed a song in praise 
Of the race of women.   (423-29) 
However, as Medea leaves behind her first-stage scheming, βουλεύουσα 402), to accede to the 
second-stage in which her “X of Y is greater” agency over her bouleumata will, however, then 
cede to the “X is greater than Y” hypostasis of warrior Thumos, she will win the kleos that only a 
Muse of women can rightly confer.  What is it that galled Medea so that she would not be 
satisfied with her first-stage feminine bouleumata if not those first words of Jason’s, that 
unwittingly mocked Medea’s own vexed, ποικίλος words to Creon, as he suggests that “things 
would have gone lightly—softly, in a feminine way—had she only submitted to the bouleumata 
of her betters,” κούφως φερούσῃ κρεισσόνων βουλεύματα (449 cf. 315)?  These words that come 
directly after the choral ode just above trigger Medea’s aspiration for a greater thumos and the 
greater kleos that it will win.  The “kleos will be supreme,” εὐκλεέστατος 810),47 that she will 
win once she has succeeded in the new—tragic—plan for the infanticide (803).  Medea’s kleos 
will be the best as the thumos of her plans is greater: “Let none dare judge, νομιζέτω (807 [cf. 
301]), her slight, nor weak, nor mild.”  For if a woman would rather stand three times behind a 
 
47 Similarly, Boedekker frames Medea’s epic heroic status in light of her attention to the play of logoi as the focus of 
her competition with Jason: “This plot, Medea declares, will give her heroic, virtually epic status (807-10): ‘Let no 
one consider me shiftless and weak, or easygoing, but of the other sort, harsh to enemies and to friends kind. For the 
life of such people is best-famed (εὐκλεέστατος)’” (1991, 107). 
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shield than bear one child, how much greater is the pain, and the courage, the thumos, required 
to kill two?  In other words, how much greater is the kleos conferred by the Muse of women, 
how much greater Euripides’ ironic “kleos” of tragedy than that of epic? 48   
 Medea’s decision to kill the children instead of Jason is perhaps governed less by the 
prospect that the death of the children might bring greater suffering to Jason than his own death 
itself, than it is by Medea’s (/Euripides’) goal to define a supreme kleos unarguably 
greater―albeit however ethically vitiated―than any hero of old, any old epic hero.  It is, 
moreover, her accession to her second-stage bouleumata and warrior thumos that leads from the 
mere abrogation of the thespis of the Muse of old to the advent of a new Muse of women.  And 
so I return, again, to the chorus’ words that follows 1079: 
Several times over now [πολλάκις], 
Have I gone through mythoi more finely wrought [λεπτοτέρων], 
And come to a greater contest [ἁμίλλας…μείζους] than 
The race of women should have to engage. 
But now indeed there is a Muse for us women, 
 
48 In line with Knox’s and Bongie’s studies of the heroic framework referenced above, Segal states, “Euripides 
presentation of the heroic ethos in such a figure (a woman and a mother) and with such a deed (the killing of the 
children) calls the heroic ethos itself into question” (1996, 18).  Although working within the limits of the classical 
readings of 1079, Segal does read for the way in which Medea is as well a victim of her thumos: “she sees herself, 
finally, as helpless before the power of passion or emotion, which she here objectifies and virtually personifies as 
θυμὸς.  She even entreats θυμὸς, in the vocative, not to do the deed” (24).  I would hope I would not be quibbling to 
respond, however, that it is in this moment that the thumos, or, Thumos, in question, as specifically that of a warrior 
aspiring for kleos, albeit ironically, transcends passion and emotion.  See also Boedekker: “the story of Jason’s great 
adventures––his epic-like λόγος and its intended sequel––has been turned into a tragedy by Medea,” what she terms 
a “triumph of tragedy over epic” (1991, 108-09).  Although she doesn’t quite call this inflection of tragedy ironic, 
she does appreciate the meta-narrational play of Euripides’ art as vying with the tradition of epic: “in this triumph of 
tragedy over epic, Medea retains the upper hand not least in her authorial role, her collusion with Euripides in 
creating her own new λόγος” (109).  I not only concur with her characterization of Euripides’ critical relationship to 
epic, and mythic “truth,” but I have also explicated a comparably explicit critique of epic in my treatment of 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (2001).  But that is not an end, or rather beginning, to it, for I have also argued that such a 
critical relationship to myth and the oral tradition already defined Homer’s re-interpretation of traditional epic writ 
large in Iliad ad Nihilum: Psyche, Conscience, Wonder.  See also Barlow (1989, 165). 
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Who consorts with us by force of cleverness 
It is not so with all of us, but just the same 
You would find some among the race of women 
Who is not without her Muse.   (1081-89) 
So what would these authoritative words, these new mythoi, be that are more finely wrought, 
λεπτοτέρων?  What would they be greater than?  Are these not the stuff of Medea’s bouleumata 
as they outdo Jason’s, bouleumata that have been recast, reworked, “several times over,” 
πολλάκις—in the process of Euripides’ reworking of the Medea of myth, not to mention  
Neophron’s—from their first- to second-stage?  Is the chorus here not referring to the 
bouleumata that, in the “X of Y is greater” construction prove greater than those, Jason’s, that 
remain implied?  Are these not the more finely wrought schemes, bouleumata, that—having 
been worked over from Creon, to Medea, to Jason, to Medea again disingenuously, to Jason 
again, and finally to the “Medea” who is on the brink of no longer being in command of her own 
words nor deeds—both Medea and, vicariously the chorus, must go through to reach the 
threshold of that superior, kreissōn, “X is greater than Y” Thumos that will take Medea, and with 
her, the race of women to that contest no woman should ever have had to brave and the kleos that 
is at once beyond all that has gone before, and that will retire once and for all the ethos and 
naïvely celebrated kleos of epic?  
Such, I submit, are the new “mythoi” of a “Muse” who holds sway no longer through the 




The shape of my reading requires a transit, if I may put it that way, through the reading of the 
genitive bouleumatōn as subjective governed by kreissōn in my proposed X of my Y is greater 
grammar to return to the familiar comparative grammar of thumos is greater than my 
bouleumata.  The grammar of the comparative reading is of course such as is commonly 
assumed, and for good reason, and in the end I am arguing that we return to it, albeit with a new 
charge on the relationship between thumos and bouleumata that is only available by admitting as 
well the alternate grammar.  It is worth trying to articulate how the combination of these two 
parsings could be felt at once through a pointed focus on the force of δὲ in the line.  With the 
genitive as subjective the phrase τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων comes as a qualifying afterthought.  In 
this reading―the thumos (of my bouleumatōn) is greater―the phrase as a subjective genitive is 
thus essentially parenthetical.  The essence of the statement is that Thumos is greater, that is, 
[Medea’s] Thumos is greater, where I bracket [Medea] to express the equivocation on the notion 
of this hypostasized Thumos as no longer properly possessed by Medea qua person.  What has 
emerged through what has been unleashed through Medea’s bouleumata is this dæmonic 
Thumos, emphasized at the line opening with the δὲ in combination with κρείσσων.  That 
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων is the essence of the statement is established with the postpositive placement 
of the δὲ; the remainder of the line, τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, is thus an optional and subordinated 
qualifying phrase.  Now in the novel reading I propose the fact that the thumos in question is the 
thumos associated with Medea’s as opposed to Jason’s (and Creon’s) bouleumata is critical; the 
emphasis of the statement, however, is on thumos as opposed to bouleumata because the notion 
of Medea as a female agent is what represents the shocking impact: it is remarkable that Medea 
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as a woman could exhibit a thumos that could vie with that of men, a θυμὸς that is indeed (δὲ) 
κρείσσων. 
 But the emphasis remains on Thumos even as we shift to the grammar of the comparative 
reading taken in the sense I read it.  It is Thumos that is greater, greater that is than my 
bouleumata which, in being quite thoroughly recast from their original expression of personal 
agency, are, again, little more than an afterthought.  It is Thumos, δὲ, that is greater. 
 In both parsings though, there is also a secondary emphasis that falls on ἐμῶν.  In the 
novel reading it is the thumos of my plans that is greater, greater than what is left unstated, that 
is, the thumos of another, of Jason’s (and Creon’s).  In the revalued comparative reading, 
Thumos is greater than my plans, that is, what were my plans, but are really no longer relevant as 
such. Thumos is entirely eclipsing what was what Medea only once could have called “my” 
agency.   
 
So when it comes now to the question of possible comparanda for my proposed reading, when 
working from the received assumptions we are faced with two challenges to consider.  First, 
there is the question of suspending at first the assumption of the apparently self-evident 
comparative reading; second, there is the challenge of supposing the complex force of the dual 
reading that I finally arrive at, which does at least, happily, reclaim the comparative grammar.  I 
will not attempt to downplay the fact that I have been able to find precious little by way of 
obvious comparanda for my X of Y is greater reading; however, I would ask how likely it would 
be to find comparanda for that grammar in combination with the commonly accepted 
comparative grammar?  I contend that Euripides has construed this dual construction for the 
peculiar, the quite unique, circumstances of Medea’s case with all that is so essentially divided 
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about her, a Medea, moreover, recast from Neophron’s where thumos and bouleusai are 
unequivocally connected.  So I suggest that we would need to be mindful of what we can 
reasonably expect to find by way of comparanda.  Moreover, it strikes me that the stickler’s 
demand that we must necessarily find definite comparanda for the phrasing that X is greater 
[than Z], where Z is left unstated, would be an overly stringent expectation.  Is there really any 
less reason to suppose that a sophisticated poet such as Euripides would be any less likely or able 
to abbreviate the fully expressed comparative construction than any poet in any Indo-European 
language, ancient or modern?  Would guarding against the possible risk of admitting this 
possibility on the basis of a basic sense for linguistical logic warrant foreclosing on the possible 
advancement?  And if Euripides’ poesy is indeed this deft, would we not fall short of his measure 
should we preclude due consideration of this possibility? 
 Is it not a simple matter linguistically to effect this construction?  Indeed, we can find 
instances in which we can see something of the means by which the suppression of the second of 
the comparands of the comparative can be felt as possible. So at Hippolytus 960 the phrase, 
ποῖοι γὰρ ὅρκοι κρείσσονες, would be construed, “for what sort of oaths could be stronger…” 
while we wait for the comparand, as the compound subject of the comparison, τίνες λόγοι, “what 
arguments,” is compiled to lead to the comparand, “τῆσδ᾽,” referring to Phaedra’s letter.  As we 
read the line, or even more pointedly, as we would imagine hearing the line performed, would 
we not transit through just such a construction as I propose for 1079, “What sort of oaths could 
be stronger,” indeed, we keep going with this construction, “what arguments,” until completing 
the comparative with “than the letter”?   
 In a spoken elliptical phrase such as, πότερος ὁ κρείσσων; (Helen 139) we can see that 
the notion of the two comparands is there, while literally the phrasing gives us ὁ κρείσσων as 
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referring to the stronger in the absence of the comparand.  Similarly, κρείσσων γὰρ εἶ (Electra 
227) which would literally mean “you are stronger,” or “you are the stronger one,” the one whom 
Orestes is stronger than is left unstated.   
 In another similar instances at Hippolytus 500-03, αἴσχρ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμείνω τῶν καλῶν τάδ᾽  
ἐστί σοι:  | κρεῖσσον δὲ τοὔργον, εἴπερ ἐκσώσει γέ σε, |  ἢ τοὔνομ᾽, we see a fully stated 
comparative construction with ἀμείνω; with κρεῖσσον we see the comparand, ἢ τοὔνομ᾽, again 
deferred by the interceding phrase.  But I also point to this example to segue to another instance 
at Suppliants 1101-03 in which we find a proper comparandum for the grammar of my reading 
with, however, admittedly not kreissōn but rather its near synonym meizōn: πατρὶ δ᾽ οὐδὲν  
†ἥδιον†  | γέροντι θυγατρός: ἀρσένων δὲ μείζονες |  ψυχαί, “For nothing is sweeter for an old 
father than a daughter; while the psychæ of boys are greater.”  In this instance we see first the 
full comparative construction followed immediately by the construction in which the comparand 
is unstated along with a modifying subjective genitive, ἀρσένων:  
The psychæ of boys are greater 
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